In the section “The Devil’s Gambit’ Brody argues that
the willingness model of addiction fails to completely describe the intricacies
of addiction. To understand Brody’s point it is useful to understand
the model he is arguing against. Earlier in the article Brody articulates the
model by saying “On this view, what the addict does can be explained in terms
of Socrates’ willingness model and an addict’s immoral character: ie, they want
to do it, and care more about satisfying their addiction than the consequences
of doing so.” (Brody) (Graff 19-29)
Although I recognize that addiction certainly impairs one’s self control and is
not necessarily rooted in immorality, I would agree with Socrates that this
impairment is rooted in the compromise of their ability to perform proper value
judgements under temptation.(Graff 64) I
would also agree that it is unfair to characterize the addict as immoral
because of their addiction, but neither should immorality be necessary for
addiction under Socrates’ original premise that “human nature means we want to
do what we think is best. So, he argues, if we believe we know what the good
(the best) thing to do is, and it is accessible to us, we will do the good. However,
says Socrates, things which tempt us can have the power to alter our perception
or understanding of their value, making them deceptively appear to be what is
best.”(Brody) (Graff 72) Brody uses a story about an alcoholic in
hell to illustrate his argument that “choices enacted willingly can mask an
impaired control of compulsive processes.” (Brody)(Graff 43) In Brody’s example
of the addict in hell he argues that the addict is displaying the common
behavior that “addicts know that
they are failing to enact their preference, and they do not intellectually
sanction their akratic acts, even though they have intentionally engaged in
them.”(Brody) In the case of an addict acknowledging that the thing they are
doing is not the best for them in general they are not violating the principle
that people only do what they believe to be best for them in the moment. A
person is perfectly capable of acknowledging that there are negatives to what
they are doing, but still do the thing because their addiction causes them to
underestimate the downsides of their action and decide that in the moment it is
the best thing to do. This doesn’t mean the addict believes their actions to
actually be the best thing for them, but in the moment they will have convinced
themselves that it is best to act contrary to the general rule because it will
relieve the stresses incurred by not indulging their addiction. It is due to
this nuance that the willingness model remains accurate under the different
circumstances of addiction and Brody’s earlier argument about compulsive
processes impairing control does not necessarily contradict the willingness
model as Brody seems to think it does.
Brody, Alan. "Addicts, Mythmakers and Philosophers." Philosophy Now.
Philosophy Now, 2012. Web. 13 Oct. 2015. <https://philosophynow.org/issues/90/Addicts_Mythmakers_and_Philosophers>.
Graff, Gerald, Cathy Birkenstein, and Russel Durst. They Say / I Say. 3rd ed. New York:
W.W. Norton, 2015. Print.
This is a solid quote of analysis "A person is perfectly capable of acknowledging that there are negatives to what they are doing, but still do the thing because their addiction causes them to underestimate the downsides of their action and decide that in the moment it is the best thing to do." My blog focused on this idea as well. Good job
ReplyDeleteInteresting examples from the article. specifically, “addicts know that they are failing to enact their preference, and they do not intellectually sanction their akratic acts, even though they have intentionally engaged in them.” Make sure you bold paradigms from TSIS. good job overall. Good transitions
ReplyDeleteI like your incorporation of Socrates' philosophy into your argument, as it's complex and a bit difficult to understand, but you definitely helped the audience understand it. I also agree with your point that addiction isn't necessarily "rooted in immorality" and is also a consequence of impaired judgment.
ReplyDelete